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Recent Developments

Kansas v. Hendricks:

D

eferring
to
the
pronounced legislative
intent, the United States Supreme
Court, in Kansas v. Hendricks,
117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997), allowed
the state discretion in defining
statutory terms that have legal
significance. In a five to four
decision, the Court concluded that
Kansas' civil commitment statute
aimed
at
sexually
violent
predators satisfied substantive
due
process
requirements.
Relying on the non-punitive nature
of civil law, the Court further held
that the statute did not violate
constitutional prohibitions against
double jeopardy or ex post facto
lawmaking.
In 1994, Kansas enacted the
Sexually Violent Predator Act
("Act"). The Act was designed to
target repeat sexual offenders
who did not fall within the scope of
the existing civil commitment
statute.
Leroy
Hendricks
("Hendricks") was the first person
Kansas attempted to commit
under the new Act. Hendricks had
a long history of sexual offenses,
including
his
most
recent
conviction of taking "indecent
liberties" with two thirteen-year-old
boys. He had served nearly ten
years of his sentence and was
due to be released to a halfway
house when Kansas filed a
petition to commit him as a
sexually violent predator. At trial,
the jury found that Hendricks'
diagnosis as a pedo-phile qualified
as a "mental abnormality" under
the Act. As a result, Hendricks
was committed to the custody of
the Secretary of Social and
Rehabilitation Services until his
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pedophilia no longer presented a
threat to society.
Hendricks
appealed claiming the Act violated
the
Due
Process,
Double
Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto
Clauses of the United States
Constitution.
The Kansas Supreme Court
ruled in favor of Hendricks on his
due process claim but did not
address his double jeopardy or ex
post facto claims.
Kansas
petitioned for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court and
Hendricks filed a cross petition to
reassert his double jeopardy and
ex post facto claims. The Court
granted certiorari on both petitions
and reversed the lower court's
ruling that there was a due
process violation.
The Court began its analysis
by
emphasizing
that
an
individual's constitutionally protected right against physical
restraint can be overridden in civil
proceedings by the state. Kansas
v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072,
2079 (1997). Additionally, the
Court asserted that states have
historically provided for civil
detention of citizens whose
behavior posed a threat to public
safety. 'd. at 2079 (citing 1788
N.Y. Laws, ch. 31). Involuntary

commitment
statutes
have
. consistently been upheld where
they provide certain procedural
and evidentiary standards. 'd. at
2080 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992».
The Court acknowledged that
civil' commitment statutes have
been sustained against constitutional challenges when the
statutes required proof of a
person's dangerousness and
mental illness. 'd. at 2080 (citing
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314315 (1993); Allen v. Illinois, 478
U.S. 364,366 (1986». The Court
believed that this substantive due
process standard was met by the
Act in question. 'd. First, the Act
requires a finding that the
individual is dangerous to himself
or others before commitment can
take place. 'd. at 2080. This
condition of dangerousness is
satisfied if the person "has been
convicted of or charged with a
'd.
sexually violent offense."
(citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5929(a)(02)(a) (1994». Second, the
Act requires a finding of "mental
abnormality"
or
"personality
disorder" that makes it impossible
for the individual to control his
behavior. Id. at 2080 (citing Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 59-29(a)(02)(b)
(1994». The Court felt that the
Act sufficiently narrowed the class
of individuals to those who are
truly dangerous because of their
mental condition. 'd.
Hendricks claimed the mental
disorders that would lead to
commitment under the Act were
not equivalent to a "mental
illness," and therefore, his substantive due process rights were
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violated. 'd. The standard used
under most involuntary commitment statutes, including Kansas'
existing statute, is "mental illness"
not "mental abnormality."
'd.
However, the Court refused to
distinguish between the two terms,
asserting that states traditionally
have been charged with defining
medical terms that have legal
significance. 'd. at 2081 (citing
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
354, 365, n.13 (1983». The Act
defines a "mental abnormality" as
a "condition . . . which predisposes the person to commit
sexually violent offenses." 'd. at
2077 (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5929(a)(02)(b) (1994». The Court
found no substantive due process
violation in Kansas' choice of the
term "mental abnormality" in the
statute, and reaffirmed the jury's
finding that Hendricks' diagnosis
as a pedophile qualified as a
mental abnormality under the Act.
'd. at 2081.
Next, the Court addressed
Hendricks' cross petition claims.
Hendricks argued that the Act
established criminal proceedings
and that its effect was to institute
punishment. 'd. He asserted the
civil commitment proceeding was
based on past conduct for which
he had already been punished
and was, therefore, in violation of
the double jeopardy and ex post
facto clauses of the Constitution.
'd. The Court, unpersuaded by
Hendricks' argument, found that
the Act did not establish criminal
proceedings. 'd.
The Court proclaimed that a
determination of whether a
proceeding is civil or criminal is a
matter of statutory construction.
'd. at 2081 (quoting Allen, 478
U.S. at 368). The Court then

28.1 U. BaIt. L.F. 42

examined the history of the Act in
order to ascertain whether the
legislature intended the Act to be
a civil proceeding. 'd. at 2082.
The Court relied on two facts in
determining the legislative intent:
(1) the placement of the Act in the
probate code as opposed to the
criminal code; and (2) the
description of the Act by the
legislature as creating a civil
commitment procedure. Id. The
Court explained that the stated
legislative intent should be
overridden only when clear proof
exists that the scheme of the
statute is punitive either in
purpose or effect.
'd. (citing
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S.
242, 248-249 (1980».
Evidence of a punitive purpose
would exist if the Act furthered the
main objectives of criminal laws.
'd. The Court articulated that the
two primary objectives of criminal
laws
are
retribution
and
deterrence and that the Act did
not further either objective. 'd.
The Act was found not to be
retributive because it only
considered prior criminal conduct
as evidence to show that the
individual had the requisite
"mental
abnormality."
'd.
Additionally, the Act did not
function as a deterrent because
the individuals committed have a
"mental abnormality" that, by
definition, prevents them from
exercising any degree of control
over their behavior. 'd. Because
of their mental condition, the
threat of confinement was not a
deterrent. 'd.
Hendricks proposed other
arguments tending to prove the
Act was punitive, but each was
similarly dismissed by the Court.
Hendricks claimed that the use of

procedures under the Act normally
found in criminal trials indicated
that the Act was criminal not civil.
Id. at 2083.
In rejecting the
argument, the Court stated that
Kansas' decision "to provide some
of the safeguards applicable to
criminal trials cannot itself turn
these proceedings into criminal
prosecutions." 'd. (quoting Allen,
478 U.S. at 372).
Hendricks also argued that the
Act was punitive because it did not
offer any legitimate treatment. Id.
at 2083.
In order for this
argument to prevail, the Court
stated' that
treatment
for
Hendricks' condition would have to
have been available but failed to
be provided by the state. Id.
Additionally, if no treatment was
available for a particular condition,
this fact would still not be sufficient
evidence to deem the Act punitive.
'd. The Court has "never held
that the Constitution prevents a
State from civilly detaining those
for whom no treatment is
available, but who nonetheless
pose a danger to others." Id.
The Court did not find
sufficient proof of a punitive
purpose or effect to override the
stated legislative intent that the
Act was a civil proceeding. Id. at
2085. Because a finding that the
Act was
punitive was
a
prerequisite to the application of
the double jeopardy and ex post
facto clauses, the C'ourt dismissed
these claims.
The dissent, however, urged
that there was sufficient proof to
show a punitive purpose. Id. at
2092. For previously convicted
offenders like Hendricks, the Act
deferred the diagnosis that would
have led to treatment until
immediately prior to the scheduled
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release from prison. Id. at 2093.
The dissent believed that the
delay of treatment and the failure
to consider less restrictive
alternatives was evidence that the
Act's primary purpose was
confinement
and
therefore
punitive. Id. at 2094.
In Kansas v. Hendricks, 117
S. Ct. 2072 (1997), the Court gave
deference
to
the
Kansas
legislature's stated intent for the
Sexually Violent Predator Act and
established a seemingly impossible standard of proof to challenge
the "civil" label given to the Act.
The Court refused to acknowledge

a distinction between a "mental
illness" and a "mental abnormality," even though Kansas'
existing civil commitment statute
required a finding of "mental
illness." The Act was admittedly
created in order to circumvent the
inflexible definition of this term.
The Act was designed to cover a
person who commits sexual
offenses as a result of a
predisposition, and is likely to
commit them again if released
from prison. With this decision,
the
required
proof
of
dangerousness in the civil
commitment proceeding can be

met merely by offering a prediction
of recidivism based only on the
fact that the person committed a
sex crime in the past and does not
need to be based on a finding that
the person is currently a danger.
This case has provided the
basis for a bill introduced in the
Maryland General Assembly this
session that would provide civil
commitment as an option for
detaining sex offenders. No doubt
Maryland is the first of many
states to follow the Kansas
example.
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